COMPETITION LAW ENFORCEMENT AND MARKET EFFICIENCY IN DEVELOPING ECONOMIES

We examine how corporate governance mechanisms influence organizational performance within developing economy corporate systems and propose the Competition Enforcement Market Efficiency Model as an integrated analytical framework. Using the Developing Economy Competition Enforcement and Market Structure Dataset covering regulated firms in Ghana during 2020 to 2025, we analyze governance indicators drawn from board independence, audit committee effectiveness, and financial reporting transparency while incorporating the regulatory environment as an institutional moderator. The empirical design integrates governance indicators from OECD governance databases, regulatory indicators from World Bank governance measures, and firm performance metrics derived from corporate financial disclosures. Results reveal that stronger board independence, effective audit committee structures, and higher financial transparency consistently improve financial stability, operational efficiency, market competitiveness, and investor confidence. The analysis further demonstrates that regulatory quality strengthens the performance impact of governance mechanisms by reinforcing enforcement credibility and disclosure discipline. The findings advance governance theory by showing that internal monitoring structures and institutional regulation function as complementary governance layers that jointly shape corporate outcomes in emerging markets. The evidence provides policy guidance for regulators and strategic direction for corporate boards seeking stronger governance accountability and sustainable firm performance across developing economies.