LABOR MARKETS, INSTITUTIONS, AND RELIGION IN NIGERIA

This dissertation examines how weak formal institutions shape economic behavior and social life in Sub-Saharan Africa, with a particular focus on Nigeria. In settings where contracts are difficult to enforce, firms and individuals often rely on alternative mechanisms to organize labor relations, sustain cooperation, and structure collective life. Across chapters, I combine survey data, field experiments, and quasi-experimental evidence to study how people respond to contractual uncertainty and how informal institutions can substitute for formal enforcement. The first part of the dissertation studies salary uncertainty, a widespread phenomenon in low-income countries in which firms delay or withhold workers' pay. Using original survey and experimental data, I document that 30 percent of workers report delayed or unpaid salaries and analyze how this uncertainty shapes worker behavior on both the intensive and extensive margins. The second part investigates whether communal and religious norms can help sustain economic cooperation when formal enforcement is weak. In a field experiment, I show that religion can reduce cheating and increase contract adherence. I then turn to the broader role of religion in Nigerian society, focusing in particular on Pentecostalism. In collaboration with one of the largest Pentecostal denominations in Nigeria, I study the effects of joining a Pentecostal denomination in a quasi-experimental setting. Taken together, the dissertation shows that markets may operate differently in contexts of weak formal enforcement, with important consequences for labor markets and cooperation. Informal institutions emerge as one important substitution mechanism for formal enforcement.