Mechanisms: Historical Evidence from Botswana

Abstract The third stage of the empirical strategy considers a potential counter to the central theoretical argument; it is possible that rather than resulting from electoral incentives, any urban–rural differences in development may result from contemporaneous external forces, such as donor conditionality. If foreign donors encouraged both competitive elections and pro-rural policies, then the link between electoral competition and pro-rural development across Africa may be spurious. Chapter 6 addresses this possibility through a largely qualitative analysis of the historical case of Botswana in the period immediately following independence. This case is useful because uniquely in sub-Saharan Africa Botswana has held competitive elections consistently since gaining independence in 1966. Taking advantage of this, Chapter 6 explores the link between electoral competition and pro-rural development during a period when the international context was very different, and when no such external pressures to introduce competitive elections and rural development policies were likely to have been felt. Using archival resources such as original minutes from cabinet meetings and ministerial correspondence, the chapter traces the ruling party’s responses to electoral outcomes in the early post-independence period. Despite its dominant position, the ruling party responded strongly to losses of rural support with a major program of rural development policies. Interestingly, cabinet minutes document an explicit policy of prioritizing rural development projects that were both highly visible and likely to be completed prior to the next election, suggesting a strong role for electoral incentives. Alongside this archival evidence Chapter 6 also analyses the contents of the ruling party’s manifestos during this period to evaluate changes in policy emphasis during this period. Taken together, the evidence from this historical case strongly supports the proposed theoretical mechanism, suggesting that electoral competition does indeed lead to rural development in Africa.