Informal financial groups are central to rural financial inclusion in fragile states, yet they often operate in the ambiguous space between community self-help and formal financial regulation. This article examines how regulatory frameworks can protect savers and borrowers without destroying the local trust, flexibility, and low-cost participation that make Community Group Saving and Lending (CGSL), Village Savings and Loan Associations (VSLAs), self-help groups, and savings and credit cooperatives useful to rural communities. It draws on field evidence from a 2022-2025 South Sudanese CGSL study conducted in Eastern Equatoria, Jonglei, and Lakes States and extends the analysis through a comparative policy review of South Sudan, Uganda, and Ethiopia. The South Sudanese field evidence showed that CGSL participation was associated with agricultural productivity and investment in modern technologies, while also revealing persistent weaknesses around limited savings, informal records, group capacity, and weak links to formal credit institutions. The comparative analysis finds that Uganda has the most explicit tiered regulatory architecture for non-bank community finance through the Tier 4 and UMRA framework, Ethiopia has a relatively developed microfinance regime under the National Bank of Ethiopia but remains more institution-centred than community-group-centred, and South Sudan retains a central-bank and deposit-taking focus that leaves many small informal groups without a clear proportional pathway. The article argues that fragile states require a graduated regulatory model: legal recognition, light local registration, basic records, borrower disclosure, complaints channels, and a pathway for larger groups to graduate into licensed cooperative or microfinance status. The main contribution is a proportionality-based policy fit index and a practical supervision ladder for regulating informal financial groups in conflict-affected rural economies.