Transformative leadership and the implementation of digital education policy in Zanzibar: a sequential explanatory study of implementation barriers, challenges and enabling strategies

The digitalization of education requires leadership that can reframe institutional purpose rather than merely administer technology. Drawing on Shields' theory of transformative leadership, this study examines the implementation environment that educational leaders in Zanzibar must navigate, and asks which implementation conditions are most amenable to transformative leadership action. A sequential explanatory mixed-methods design was used. In the quantitative phase, 30 learners drawn from primary, secondary and university levels completed a 31-item instrument measuring perceived implementation barriers, challenges and strategies; in the qualitative phase, 20 teachers, lecturers and public servants were interviewed. Quantitative data were analysed using descriptive statistics, one-sample t-tests against the scale midpoint with Holm correction for multiple comparisons, 95% confidence intervals and Cohen's d; qualitative data were analysed using six-phase reflexive thematic analysis. The two strands were integrated through a connecting strategy and displayed jointly. Internal consistency of the quantitative instrument was acceptable (Cronbach's α  = 0.77). Three conditions were endorsed with large effect sizes and survived correction for multiple testing: internet infrastructure (M = 4.50, d = 2.95), stakeholder resistance (M = 4.47, d = 2.89) and delayed disbursement of digitalization grants (M = 4.90, d = 6.23). Institutional and leadership barriers were also strongly endorsed (M = 4.40, d = 2.81), while items concerning equity between rural and urban settings were rejected (M = 2.17, d = −0.79), a divergence the qualitative strand attributes to the urban location of the sampled institutions. The study contributes to the international literature by specifying which of the four transformative-leadership dimensions is load-bearing under which implementation constraint, and by showing that in a small-island developing state the binding constraint is fiscal timing rather than fiscal volume. Findings are exploratory and constrained by a small, single-jurisdiction sample.