Vote Buying and Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria: A Qualitative Document-Analysis Study of Electoral Clientelism, 2015–2023

Vote buying has become one of the most pervasive threats to democratic governance in Nigeria. Despite successive electoral reforms and the institutionalization of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), the monetization of politics remains visible and continues to strain the credibility of elections. This paper undertakes a qualitative document-analysis study of vote buying in Nigeria, examining its manifestations and implications for democratic consolidation between 2015 and 2023. Drawing on a defined corpus of secondary sources peer-reviewed scholarship, election observation reports, and official electoral guidelines the study situates vote buying within clientelism and patron–client theory. It argues that poverty, weak electoral institutions, prebendal political competition, and citizens’ distrust of governance outcomes interact to sustain the practice. The paper further distinguishes vote buying from related but distinct practices vote selling, clientelism, patronage, campaign spending, and electoral bribery and assesses its consequences for electoral integrity, accountability, programmatic competition, and trust. The study concludes by recommending stronger enforcement of campaign finance law, broker-disruption strategies at polling units, and socioeconomic interventions that raise the opportunity cost of vote selling.