Conceding to Austerity: Electoral Uncertainty and Public Support for Reform

Why do many highly polarized countries struggle to adopt measures to avoid debt crises? In this study, we test an implication of the prominent ``war of attrition" model (Alessina and Drazen 1989). It suggests that sub-national groups hoping to avoid the burden of stabilization prefer to delay reform until uncertainty over who will have to shoulder the burden is resolved. Despite a prominent theoretical basis, there is little empirical evidence testing the expectations of this model or its micro-foundations. Here, we test the implications of this theory with an original survey experiment fielded in Kenya seven months before an election. Notably, we investigate how information that manipulates perceptions of national election outcomes influences support for adopting reforms before or after the 2022 general election. We hypothesize that, in general, electoral certainty reduces preferences for delay and increases support for fiscal consolidation among those that do not expect to gain power.