Conflict and Coercion within African Political Parties

Since the return of multiparty politics across Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s, conflict and violence perpetrated by members of political parties have hampered the consolidation and development of democracy. This dissertation asks why conflict emerges within African parties, and why that conflict sometimes turns violent. While a large literature has emerged to explain violence between political parties, intra-party conflict has received far less attention. Existing theories foreground factionalism, suggesting that conflict arises as competing blocs vie for power and control over the direction of the party. But these explanations struggle to account for a substantial amount of conflict that takes place long after the polls have closed and new governments have been sworn in. Additionally, they fail to explain why so much intra-party conflict pits activists at the bottom of the party hierarchy against elites and leaders at the top. This dissertation argues that intra-party conflict is caused by a breakdown in the patronage bargain between party leaders hoping to win competitive elections and the supporters who actively work to ensure their victory. In exchange for activists' labor during election campaigns, party elites offer them access to patronage rewards in the form of jobs, contracts, and educational benefits to which the party gains access when it takes control of the government. Conflict arises between activists and elites when the latter renege on this bargain, failing to deliver promised patronage. This intra-party conflict can remain relatively peaceful, such as when activists protest, submit petitions, or host press conferences to air their grievances. Or it can turn violent, as when activists invade and vandalize party offices, or when they threaten and even physically assault party elites. Coercion improves the chances that party leaders will ultimately deliver patronage, but violence brings with it additional risks. Activists will be more likely to turn to violence when they can mitigate those risks because of high levels of coercive capacity, or when they are dependent enough on the party's financial support that they are willing to use violence in spite of its dangers. Drawing on interviews from fieldwork in Accra, Ghana as well as an original database of intra-party conflict events constructed from over a decade of reports in Ghana's major newspapers, I show that the patronage bargain is central to activists' support of Ghana's dominant political parties. I analyze the statements of party supporters, the demands they make during intra-party conflict, the individuals they target, and the location and timing of conflict events to demonstrate that Ghanaian activists enter into conflict with their own party's elites because the patronage bargain has failed. I then evaluate data on arrests, police presence, and casualties to show that violent intra-party conflict in Ghana is inherently risky. I assess the plausibility of my claim that activists who are better organized and equipped for violence are more likely to utilize coercion. And I show that even when lacking coercive capacity, Ghanaian activists who depend on patronage for their survival are more willing to use violence to ensure they receive it.