Family or Labor Market? Divorce Risk and the Persistence of Domestic Specialization in Morocco

This paper examines the persistence of women’s investment in specific family activities—such as childrearing and caregiving—within contexts characterized by high divorce risk and limited labor market opportunities. Building on a theoretical framework inspired by Landes (1978), we develop a model that captures women’s trade-offs between domestic labor and market work, while explicitly accounting for post-divorce intergenerational transfers. The central assumption is that, in developing countries like Morocco, women may anticipate future support from their children as a form of delayed compensation for past family-specific investments. This expectation can rationalize sustained investment in household-specific functions, even in the absence of direct spousal compensation or enforceable alimony. The model thus sheds light on the economic rationale behind family investment decisions in settings marked by institutional fragility, limited redistribution, and asymmetrical bargaining power within couples.