Recent food crises differ from earlier price shocks in that they have emerged from the interaction of non-traditional security factors such as climate change, supply chain disruptions, and geopolitical conflict, ultimately leading to sharp increases in food prices. This study examines the causal relationship between food shocks and conflict in 50 African countries, focusing on two exogenous shock periods: the first and second agflation episodes during 2007–2013, and the overlapping crises of the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russia–Ukraine war during 2020–2025.
Using principal component analysis and a Poisson pseudo-maximum-likelihood difference-in-differences model with two-way fixed effects, the results show that the earlier agflation period did not provide statistically consistent evidence of a causal increase in conflict frequency or fatalities. In contrast, during the recent polycrisis, deteriorating food access, weakened state capacity, and climate variability cumulatively increased conflict risks. Food insecurity also expanded beyond social discontent into more organized and political forms of conflict, including armed clashes and collective expressions of grievance.
Although Korea and Africa are not directly comparable, Korea’s high dependence on food imports offers important implications for food security policy. Future responses to unexpected food crises should move beyond stockpiling, supply expansion, and price stabilization, and strengthen social safety nets and national resilience to prevent food shocks from escalating into social unrest and conflict.