Group-based payments for ecosystem services in Malawi (V1: before any data)

We will conduct a randomized trial that tests how the institution used to distribute a conditional group incentive affects the level of the incentivized activity related to tree planting and survival. In a conditional group incentive, the decisions of each individual to contribute is dependent on their expected return, and there is typically no uncertainty about payouts. In the real world, group benefits will be distributed through local institutions that favor certain distributions over others. We are particularly interested in the effects of local control over the distribution of group-level incentives. When individuals within a group are paid equally regardless of individual contributions, strong incentives for free-riding emerge. When a group leader controls the distribution that may allow individual payments to better align with individual contributions, but it also gives rise to risks of distortions in allocation that benefit leaders and their social or family network. Expectation of these distortions may decrease individual willingness to contribute effort toward group goals. Finally, the groups themselves may decide how to distribute group incentives, but individual expectations of return in this case are likely conditional on how well the group functions. We aim to understand when local control over the distribution of group-level benefits will increase individual contributions to group targets and therefore the achievement of those targets. The practical goal of this investigation is to better understand the conditions under which group-based payments for ecosystem services can achieve their goals, in this case for ensuring seedling survival for one year as part of a national tree planting goal in rural areas of Malawi. We will also randomize whether the tree care team appointed will be required to consist of at least half women, to test whether gender-diverse or women-heavy teams are better at responding to collective goals and incentives.