HOW INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS COOPERATE FOR CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND ITS OUTCOMES

This dissertation examines the extent to which international organizations (IOs) cooperate in conflict zones and how such cooperation influences civil conflict outcomes and prospects for peace. Although IOs often share the overarching goal of reducing violence, their levels of cooperation in civil conflicts vary. I argue that conflict complexity and public support are two dimensions that IOs consider when debating the costs and benefits of cooperating for conflict management. Building on these variations, I examine how cooperation among IOs affects conflict outcomes and the durability of peace. Much of the literature on conflict outcomes focuses on the ways increased amounts of resources help reduce violence. However, I suggest that with cooperation between organizations, the resources can be distributed more effectively, reduce redundancies, improve coordination between mediation and peacekeeping, and show the organizations’ resolve to solve the conflict. Additionally, the literature has thoroughly examined how international actors promote peace by addressing commitment and information problems. Through cooperation, IOs can amplify their leverage, reinforce agreements, and raise the costs of renewed violence. I argue that cooperation increases both the likelihood and longevity of peace by multiplying resources, strengthening signals of resolve, and forming institutional partnerships that can be mobilized for future conflict management. To test these claims, I developed and employed a novel cooperation score that captures IO cooperation annually across Africa from 1991 to 2018. This dissertation contributes to the literature by conceptualizing cooperation as a scale of activity rather than a dichotomous phenomenon, offering a more nuanced understanding of IO behavior. Ultimately, it highlights IO cooperation as a critical mechanism for reducing violence and fostering sustainable peace.