Is the IMF a Scapegoat?

Governments in fiscal crisis face a dilemma: impose economic reforms to stabilize the economy, but risk mass public opposition to costly tax increases and spending cuts. One solution may be to work with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), allowing governments to engage in fiscal consolidation while blaming the Fund for the imposition of unpopular reforms. If governments ”scapegoat” the IMF does this limit voters backlash against painful economic reforms? While research has long studied this topic, we have limited knowledge about the effectiveness of these tactics shifting citizens’ blame onto the IMF, or protecting the government from negative public responses like protest or electoral punishment. This study seeks to test the microfoundations of the scapegoat hypothesis via an online survey experiment fielded in Kenya in December 2024. We expect that blaming the IMF for structural adjustment will protect the incumbent from public backlash. Using fictional newspaper vignettes, respondents are informed of impending economic reforms that are either the responsibility of the Kenyan government or the IMF. We then assess their support for the incumbent, vote intentions, and willingness to protest to test how scapegoating impacts voters’ preferences