Managing External Accountability Through School Networks: Circuit-Level Collaborative Capacity, Internal Accountability Processes, and Teacher Professional Agency in Ghanaian Basic School Circuits

Abstract Background and Objective: Performance-based accountability (PBA) systems create sustained external demands on schools; however, schools’ capacity to translate those demands into coherent internal accountability processes and ultimately into teacher professional agency remains theoretically underspecified and empirically understudied in school network contexts. This study examines whether performance-based accountability pressure is associated with internal accountability processes and teacher professional agency, and whether circuit-level collaborative capacity, the quality of cross-school peer learning and professional support within Ghana’s mandated circuit school networks, moderates the accountability–agency pathway across schools. Method Cross-sectional survey data were collected from 824 basic school teachers nested within 52 schools across 18 circuits in six regions of Ghana during the implementation of the 2019 Standards-Based Curriculum. A two-level multilevel structural equation model (MSEM) estimated in Mplus 8.10 using maximum likelihood with robust standard errors, simultaneously estimated within-level mediation, between-level direct effects, and a cross-level moderation hypothesis. Circuit collaborative capacity was operationalised as an aggregated school-level construct (rᵂᴳ(ʲ) = 0.77, ICC (1) = 0.16, ICC (2) = 0.71). Within-level indirect effects were estimated via model-constrained with 5,000 bootstrap samples. Results PBA pressure was positively associated with internal accountability processes (β = 0.43, p < .001; H1), which was substantially associated with teacher professional agency (β = 0.48, p < .001; H2). The indirect effect of PBA on agency via internal accountability was significant (indirect = 0.21, 95% CI [0.14, 0.29]; H3). At the between-school level, circuit collaborative capacity was positively associated with school-mean teacher professional agency (γ = 0.38, p < .001; H4). A cross-level interaction indicated that the PBA→internal accountability slope was significantly stronger in schools embedded in high-capacity circuits (γ = 0.26, p = .009; H5): the slope was 0.57 at high CCC versus 0.31 at low CCC, indicating that circuit collaborative capacity substantially amplifies schools’ ability to convert external accountability pressure into coherent internal accountability (slope 0.57 at high CCC versus 0.31 at low CCC; 84% amplification of conversion efficiency). ICC = 0.23, indicating that 23% of agency variance was attributable to between-school differences. Conclusions The central finding is an accountability amplification process: the PBA–internal accountability association is 84% stronger in schools embedded in high-capacity circuits than in low-capacity circuits. This pattern is consistent with the interpretation that school networks – operationalised as Ghana’s mandated circuit clusters – are not neutral conduits of external accountability demands but active structural conditions that shape how those demands are internalised. The findings are consistent with and extend Elmore’s (2004) internal accountability thesis by showing that the strength of the accountability–agency pathway is associated with network-level collaborative conditions beyond individual school characteristics and provide the first MSEM evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa on how school network governance is associated with the external accountability–teacher agency relationship.