Private Benefits, Public Harms, and Citizen Participation in Corruption: a Field Experiment in Nairobi, Kenya

Abstract In a two-stage field experiment (N = 1,403) in Nairobi, Kenya, we demonstrate that citizens’ own self-interest legitimates common instances of corruption but concerns for harming others subsequently attenuates real willingness to participate in it. An in-person vignette experiment that manipulates the reason bribes are commonly paid demonstrates that public support for bribery is highest when bribes function as a cooperative arrangement with officials that helps citizens avoid consequences of their own mistakes and misdeeds, even though participants also recognize that these self-interested bribes cause significant harm to other citizens and institutions. In a follow-up behavioral experiment, the same respondents were offered an opportunity to cooperate with a corrupt official to receive a disproportionate cash payment following their participation in the study. Willingness to engage in the corrupt transaction was significantly reduced by a subtle reminder that accepting the additional funds could result in monetary loss to other citizens. We compare our results to earlier work using laboratory-based bribery games and discuss the potential for anti-corruption strategies based on the same types of social group preferences normally regarded as detrimental to macro-level collective action.