Replication Data for: Terrorism, Dynamic Commitment Problems, and Military Conflict

Since 9/11, several states initiated military conflicts in the name of fighting terrorism. However, studies indicate that the costs of terrorism are insignificant compared to the damage created by war. This raises the question: why do states initiate costly wars when the risk posed by terrorism appears marginal? This study presents two explanations. First, we argue that while terrorists frequently fail to achieve their strategic objectives, terrorists can accomplish tactical objectives, and may transition to insurgencies by seizing control of pockets of territory. States may respond by initiating preventive wars to stop terrorists from consolidating control over their strategically valuable territories (such as resource rich areas). Second, rival states may opportunistically exploit terrorist violence by declaring that the government is a ‘weak state.’ This allows rivals to seize portions of the government’s territory under the cover of fighting terror. We test these hypotheses using post-Cold war African dyads from 1990-2006. This dataset underwent an independent verification process that replicated the tables and figures in the main article and those included in supplementary materials on which primary findings are contingent. The verification process was carried out by the Odum Institute for Research in Social Science at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
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