Revisiting alliances in Somalia's Civil War

Alliances in Somalia have often appeared unpredictable to external observers. Since the collapse of Siad Barre’s regime in 1991, the country’s civil war has been characterized by fluid political alignments and constantly renegotiated alliances. Although lineage solidarity – the main determinant of political allegiances according to the classic Somali studies literature – has remained the foundation of political mobilisation, it cannot explain alliance choices on its own. At many times, the most intense fighting has been between rivals from the same clan or sub-clan, who have established alliances with groups involved in similar intra-clan competition within other clan-families, illustrating the limits of lineage solidarity based on genealogical proximity. This thesis suggests a framework for understanding alliance formation in Somalia’s civil war that builds on the classic Somali studies literature, but moves away from culturally specific explanations by drawing on alternative approaches to alliance dynamics, including the realist tradition and the literature on the political economy of civil wars. It argues that Somalia’s civil war has not been about winning as much as it has been about not losing, and points to an underlying defensive logic to alliance formation often overlooked in favour of explanations that emphasize opportunism. It argues that alliance choices have largely been determined by perceptions of threat: the main tendency has been for political actors to focus on the main threat to their interests, and to draw support from allies accordingly. The thesis highlights three patterns in alliance formation: how alliances have been formed vertically as well as horizontally between local, regional, and national actors; how interaction between different arenas of competition in Somalia has shaped alliance formation; and how expectations of the emerging political order in Somalia have shaped perceptions of threat and informed alliance choices. Through its analysis, the thesis provides a detailed historical narrative about alliances in Somalia from 1988 to 2001 and outlines a number of alliance patterns that can be seen in that particular period as well as in the country’s past and in the contemporary crisis. It builds on interviews with key players in Somalia’s civil war, including faction leaders, politicians, foreign diplomats, and representatives from other countries in the region, as well as original documents from Somali factions and international organisations.