Strategic mineral competition and democratic governance in Africa

Abstract African countries have become focal points of a new round of competition among global powers to access key minerals required for an emerging green transition, as well as for advanced digital infrastructure and modern weaponry. In addition to their relatively high level of reserves of such minerals, which include cobalt, lithium, graphite and several types of rare earths, Africa is also home to many of the world’s most important deposits. These mineral riches present, however, a contradictory situation: on one hand, they represent the critical resources needed to achieve a low-carbon future; but on the other hand, these same resources are often extracted under circumstances that contribute to weak or non-existent democratic institutions and support the type of dependency relationships characteristic of the colonial period. This article examines how the competition for control of strategic minerals in Africa impacts domestic governance arrangements and security frameworks. In particular, it examines whether this competition supports or undermines democratic space in African countries through content reviews of official government reports, international treaties or accords, speeches delivered by senior government officials and structured observations. Based on its findings, the project argues that the competition for control of strategic minerals has had an adverse effect on democracy in Africa. Specifically, the project finds that this competition has empowered executives at the expense of parliamentarians and independent judiciaries; has encouraged executive branches to limit parliamentary oversight and judicial review of executive actions related to extraction activities; has allowed governments to expand their authority over regions where extractive activities take place securitize extraction; and has reduced opportunities for citizens to participate in decision-making processes regarding extractive activities. The paper further finds that, because major global actors prioritize securing their supply chains for strategic minerals and positioning themselves geopolitically relative to competitors over holding foreign governments accountable for adhering to democratic norms and standards, there exist significant perverse incentives for governments of African countries to sacrifice democratic principles and procedures to secure foreign investment and cooperation on national security issues. The results contradict liberal theories’ assumption that economic interdependence is likely to lead to better governed countries. The project instead shows that international competition for natural resources can lead to the embedding of anti-democratic governance practices into the national security architecture of states. Finally, the project finds that without developing regional approaches to governing strategic minerals, the probability that illiberal security regimes will develop across sub-Saharan Africa will increase while prospects for democratic development will decrease.