Causal Effects of Economic Forecasting Reform on Institutional Accountability in Uganda: A Difference-in-Differences Design

While the literature on transparency initiatives often assumes a direct link between improved information and accountable governance, the mechanisms connecting forecasting institutions to political and bureaucratic behaviour remain theoretically underspecified and empirically contested. The analysis addresses this gap by conceptualising forecasting reform as a change in the informational environment of budgetary decision-making, and by identifying plausible channels through which such change might discipline fiscal conduct. A formal identification strategy is proposed, exploiting the staggered rollout of forecasting capacity across Ugandan ministries and districts. The design confronts core threats to validity, including anticipatory behaviour, spillover effects and the non-random placement of reform. The central proposition is that forecasting reform improves accountability primarily by altering the reputational costs of fiscal indiscipline among political principals, rather than by directly empowering citizens or auditors.