This article interrogates the persistent disconnect between early warning capacity and timely
conflict response within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) from 2010
to 2025. Despite the establishment of the ECOWAS Early Warning and Response Network
(ECOWARN) as the central pillar of the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) of
2008, the sub-region witnessed a cascade of unconstitutional changes of government in Mali
(2020, 2021), Guinea (2021), Burkina Faso (2022), and Niger (2023), culminating in the historic
withdrawal of three ECOWAS member states from the organisation in January 2025. The article
draws on qualitative data from twenty-five semi-structured interviews conducted at ECOWAS
headquarters in Abuja, as well as thematic documentary analysis of ECOWAS institutional
reports, peace fund strategic plans, and current scholarship. Grounded in Regional Integration
Theory and Conflict Prevention Theory, the article identifies three structural drivers of the
warning–response gap: weak political will among member states; chronic financing deficits and
donor dependency; and bureaucratic fragmentation within the ECOWAS institutional
architecture. The article further finds that while ECOWARN's detection capabilities are
technically mature—covering 55 pre-defined indicators and 42 event types—the system's outputs
are routinely treated as advisory rather than action-triggering by member state governments.
The article concludes by proposing a Mandatory Response-Trigger Framework, a pre-funded
Early Response Reserve, and a Community-Based Early Warning Integration Initiative as
concrete measures to close the warning–response gap. The findings carry significant
implications for the broader literature on regional early warning systems and for ECOWAS's
credibility as a regional security actor at a critical juncture.