LEGISLATURE–EXECUTIVE CRISIS IN NIGERIA: INTERROGATING LAGOS AND RIVERS STATE HOUSES OF ASSEMBLY

Legislature–executive relations are fundamental to democratic governance, particularly within presidential and federal systems such as Nigeria’s. Despite constitutional provisions guaranteeing separation of powers, Nigeria’s Fourth Republic has witnessed persistent subnational conflicts between governors and state Houses of Assembly. This paper interrogates the nature, causes, and implications of legislature–executive crises in Nigeria, focusing on Lagos and Rivers States as critical comparative cases. Drawing attention to recent political developments, the study examines the impeachment and subsequent reinstatement of the Speaker of the Lagos State House of Assembly, Mudashiru Obasa, following presidential and party intervention, as well as the ongoing Rivers State House of Assembly crisis involving attempted impeachment of Governor Siminalayi Fubara and the influential role of former governor and current Minister of theFederal Capital Territory, Nyesom Wike. Anchored in separation of powers theory, elite theory, and dominant-party theory, the paper adopts a qualitative, comparative approach, utilizing constitutional analysis, secondary literature, and contemporary political evidence. It argues that impeachment at the subnational level has increasingly been transformed from a constitutional accountability mechanism into an instrument of elite contestation and political control. While Lagos State illustrates managed legislative stability under dominant-party influence, Rivers State demonstrates how elite fragmentation and executive overreach can precipitate institutional paralysis. The paper concludes that Nigeria’s democratic consolidation remains fragile at the state level due to executive dominance, weak legislative autonomy, and politicized constitutional processes, and it offers policy-relevant recommendations aimed at strengthening subnational democracy.